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Abstract
The Bayesian persuasion model studies communication between an informed sender
and a receiver with a payoff-relevant action, emphasizing the ability of a sender to
extract maximal surplus from his informational advantage. In this paper we study a
setting with multiple senders, but in which the receiver interacts with only one sender
of his choice: senders commit to signals and the receiver then chooses, at the interim
stage, with which sender to interact. Our main result is that whenever senders are
even slightly uncertain about each other’s preferences, the receiver receives all the
informational surplus in all equilibria of this game.
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1 Introduction
The celebrated model of information design known as Bayesian persuasion (Kamenica and Gentzkow,
2011) studies a setting where some agents, typically known as senders, receive private in-
formation. Other agents, known as receivers, must choose an action that affects their own
payoff as well as the senders’. The senders’ challenge, and the focus of the literature, is
to decide how much of the information they should share with the receivers. In particular,
the Bayesian persuasion model captures settings where the informed senders can commit to
a signal—a distribution over messages that depends on the senders’ information—prior to
learning their private information.
Although senders take no action, the combination of access to private information with
the ability to commit to a signal proves to be quite advantageous. However, when multiple
senders are involved, this advantage may decline. Indeed, recent work discusses the deteri-
oration in senders’ payoffs as more senders compete, at the same time benefiting the single
receiver. We discuss some of these results in Section 1.2.
In this paper we provide a new model of competition among senders. In our model there
are multiple senders and a state space for each of the senders and receiver. States are a
priori unknown, but there may be almost arbitrary correlation between different players’
states. As always, senders commit to a signal prior to receiving any private information.
In contrast with other models, however, our receiver is restricted to receiving one message,
from a sender of his choice.
From a descriptive perspective, there are many settings in which the receiver may lack the
attention to receive input from all senders. For example, the receiver may be a policymaker
contemplating the implementation of some policy, and the senders may be experts who are
knowledgeable about the policy’s projected implications. Consulting with all the experts
may be costly; instead, the policymaker might just choose one with whom to consult.1
Alternatively, the receiver may be a judge or court of law and the senders prosecutors
arguing a case (as in the canonical example of Kamenica and Gentzkow, 2011). The court
may be limited in the number of cases it can hear, and so may have to choose with which
prosecutors to interact.
From a normative perspective, when the receiver has flexibility in choosing how much
advice to receive, he may prefer to limit the amount of advice. Indeed, our main result is
that in all equilibria of the game, the receiver learns all of his payoff-relevant information.
1During the recent COVID-19 pandemic many academics tried to provide input to their own governments,
but they soon realized there is congestion in advice, and could not make themselves heard.
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That is, with as few as two competing senders, the receiver reaps all of the informational
surplus. We obtain this strong dichotomy between the single- and multiple-sender cases in
a very general model. We allow for an arbitrary information structure and arbitrary utility
functions of the senders, as long as senders are not perfectly aligned in their objectives.
Without this assumption—that is, if senders are perfectly aligned—then the multiple-sender
case is nearly identical to the the single-sender case, and so the informational surplus is
primarily enjoyed by the senders.
Our main result leads to two counterintuitive observations: First, from the receiver’s
point of view, the restriction to interacting with just a single sender is actually a benefit,
and in fact should be self-imposed. Second, from the senders’ point of view, commitment
power could be a double-edged sword. A single sender interacting with a receiver is always
better off with commitment power, but with more than one sender that same commitment
power could be strictly harmful. Here, senders may be better off forgoing this power.
1.1 Motivating Examples
We now discuss these observations in greater detail.
Example 1 (Inspired by an example of Kamenica and Gentzkow, 2011.) There is
a government policy that may be beneficial or harmful and a policymaker who can either
implement the policy (action P ) or maintain the status quo (action Q). Additionally, there
are two experts, and each is either biased or unbiased. The biased type always wants the
policy implemented (similarly to the prosecutor in the example of Kamenica and Gentzkow,
2011) whereas the unbiased type is aligned with the policymaker. Each player obtains utility
1 when his preferred action is taken, and utility 0 otherwise.
The prior distribution over the information is as follows: The policy is beneficial with
probability 0.5 and each of the experts is unbiased with probability ε > 0, all independently.
Each expert learns his own type and whether or not the policy is beneficial.
Before we discuss competition between experts we consider the optimal signal for a single
expert, absent competition. As a single, unbiased expert is fully aligned with the policymaker
he will fully disclose the policy’s benefit. On the other hand, a biased expert will always
recommend implementation. As a result, the policymaker will implement the policy upon
hearing a recommendation to implement, and will maintain the status quo otherwise. This
yields an expected utility of 1 to the expert and 0.5 + ε/2 to the policymaker.
We now return to the two-sender setting and consider two variants of the game. In
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the first, the policymaker chooses one expert with whom to interact (which is the model
discussed in the paper). In the second, the policymaker interacts with both.
• Two senders and one signal: This is the setting we will analyze in the rest of
the paper. In this setting the policymaker chooses a single expert, and observes the
realization only of that expert’s signal. We apply our main result, Theorem 1, to
deduce that in this setting the policymaker will always take his correct action. This
means that the experts’ utility drops to 0.5 + ε/2, while the policymaker’s increases
to 1. Note that this conclusion holds for any ε > 0. However, at ε = 0 we witness
a striking discontinuity, as all experts can now choose the sender-optimal signal from
the single-expert case, and will then fully enjoy their informational advantage.2
• Two senders and two signals: What if the policymaker observes both experts’
signal realizations? Consider the case where all experts adopt the optimal course
of action for the single-expert setting. As the policymaker observes all realizations
of signals his optimal strategy is to maintain the status quo if one or more of the
experts recommends this, and otherwise implement the policy. For small ε, the result
is that the experts once again (almost) fully extract the informational surplus, while
the policymaker expects a utility close to 0.5: With probability (1− ε)2, both experts
are biased and recommend implementation, and the policymaker obliges, leading to an
expected utility of 0.5 for the latter in this case.
To see why this strategy profile constitutes an equilibrium in the game note that an
unbiased expert always gets utility of 1, and so cannot improve. A biased expert
gets utility 1 when the other expert is also biased, since then both recommend their
optimal action, implementation. The only situation in which a biased expert does not
get his maximal utility is when the other expert is unbiased and the policy harmful.
However, in this case he cannot change the policymaker’s action from Q to P , since
the policymaker knows that the other expert’s recommendation is aligned with his own
preference.
Thus, in the example above the receiver strictly prefers to choose and interact with just one
sender rather than to observe both senders’ signal realizations.
2That is, each expert always recommends implementation, and the policymaker obliges as he is indifferent.
A slight perturbation of the prior upwards, or of the expert’s signals, renders this his strictly optimal action.
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A sender that can commit to his future course of action enjoys an obvious advantage over
one who cannot, whenever he monopolizes information. To see this, observe that a sender
with commitment power can always simulate one that has no such power. In the competitive
setting, however, all the informational surplus is enjoyed by the receiver, and so commitment
power is no longer an obvious benefit. Indeed, the following example demonstrates the
possibility that senders engaged in competition may prefer to have no commitment power:
Example 2 Consider a regulator who is contemplating the imposition of restrictions in the
market for electronic cigarettes. The regulator can tap in to one of two leading experts
(lobbyists) on this market. Expert 1 supports the restrictions only if e-cigarettes increase
lung cancer rates, modeled as a binary state: healthy (H) and unhealthy (U). Expert 2
supports the restrictions only when traditional cigarettes are more popular with women (W )
than with men (M). Finally, the regulator is interested in imposing restrictions only if
electronic cigarettes increase smoking rates among youth (Y vs. O). Each of the players
receives a utility of 1 if restrictions are imposed when they prefer them, and 0 otherwise.
There are 8 states of the world, and suppose the prior distribution over them is given by
P (M,H, Y ) = 0.18 P (M,H,O) = 0.08 P (M,U, Y ) = 0.12 P (M,U,O) = 0.12
P (W,H, Y ) = 0.12 P (W,H,O) = 0.12 P (W,U, Y ) = 0.08 P (W,U,O) = 0.18
Each of the experts learns his own payoff-relevant state as well as the receiver’s payoff-
relevant state, but not that of the other expert. Our main result, Theorem 1, implies that
whenever experts commit to signals and only one sender is chosen by the regulator, the
regulator always takes his preferred action. Thus, the unique equilibrium payoffs are 1 to
the regulator and 0.4 to each expert.
In contrast, absent any commitment power the two experts could provide no information
in equilibrium,3 the regulator would take an arbitrary action as he is indifferent, and experts
would enjoy a higher payoff of 0.5.4
Thus, this example demonstrates that commitment power could be a double-edged sword
for the senders: It is beneficial when there is a single sender, but can be strictly harmful
when there are multiple senders.
3This follows from standard cheap-talk arguments.
4The interested reader can verify that with a single sender the commitment power is advantageous.
Assume only one expert, say the first one, and note that the induced prior is P (H,Y ) = 0.3, P (H,O) =
0.2, P (U, Y ) = 0.2, P (U,O) = 0.3. With commitment power the expert expects a payoff of 0.9, above and
beyond the payoff of 0.5 he expects absent such power.
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1.2 Related Literature
The study of Bayesian persuasion was initiated by Aumann and Maschler (1966) and came
back into focus more recently following the work of Kamenica and Gentzkow (2011), lead-
ing to a plethora of variants (e.g., Celli et al., 2020; Arieli and Babichenko, 2019; Ely, 2017;
Ely et al., 2015; Au, 2015; Emek et al., 2012; Alonso and Caˆmara, 2016; Kolotilin, 2015;
Goldstein and Leitner, 2018; Rabinovich et al., 2015; Koessler et al., 2019). Kamenica (2019)
provides a good overview of Bayesian persuasion and some of the extensions.
Our research contributes to work on competing senders and the effect this competition has
on the amount of information revealed to the receiver. This work includes Gentzkow and Kamenica
(2017a), who study a model in which the decision maker receives the realized signals from
every sender before making a decision. They show that increasing the number of senders
cannot decrease the amount of information revealed to the receiver. Their work is supple-
mented by that of Li and Norman (2018), who show that the assumptions in the previous
reference are critical and the result does not hold if any are violated. We show a stark
contrast between the model of Gentzkow and Kamenica (2017a) and one where the receiver
is restricted to receiving the realized signal from a single sender. In the latter model the
signals of competing senders in equilibrium are fully informative to the receiver, whereas in
the former there are cases where equilibria are not fully informative.
Au and Kawai (2020) study the case of n senders with a valuation drawn independently
from a single known distribution competing for the patronage of a receiver. Only a single
sender can be chosen by the receiver and only this sender gets a positive payoff. The receiver’s
payoff is determined by the chosen sender’s valuation. The paper shows that an increase
in the number of senders increases the amount of information revealed by each individual
sender. In contrast to this, our model allows for almost arbitrary correlation between the
senders and the receiver. Additionally, we allow multiple senders to profit from the receiver’s
decision. Our setting shows that already with two senders, senders are fully informative.
Finally, Gentzkow and Kamenica (2017b), compare the information revealed when senders
compete to that of collusive senders in the same scenario. They identify a condition on the
information structure which is necessary and sufficient for competition to increase the in-
formativeness of signals in a broad class of settings. We note that this condition does not
hold in our setup. They also show that their result does not hold if mixed equilibria are
permitted, whereas our result holds for both pure and mixed equilibria. We use a different
approach and focus on commitment power, comparing the information revealed and payoff
for a single sender to that of multiple competing senders.
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2 Model
Some of the notation is adapted from Gentzkow and Kamenica (2017b). There are n senders,
denoted {1, . . . , n}, and a single receiver, denoted R. The state space is finite and is of the
form Ω = Ω1× . . .×Ωn ×ΩR, with a typical element ω = (ω1, . . . , ωn, ωR). The senders and
receiver share a common prior µ0 over Ω.
The receiver is the only player with a payoff relevant action. Let A denote this set of
actions and uR : A × ΩR 7→ R and ui : A × Ωi 7→ R the payoff functions of the receiver
and sender i, respectively. Note that each player’s payoff depends only on the corresponding
entry in the state space. This generalizes the standard model in which there is a common,
payoff-relevant state Ω to all players, as the prior could be such that ωR = ω1 = . . . = ωn
always. Our assumptions on utilities will limit this generality to some extent, however.
We make two assumptions. The first, made solely to simplify the exposition, states that
each player has a unique optimal action in each state:
Assumption 1 For every j ∈ {1, . . . , n, R} and ωj ∈ Ωj, the set argmaxa∈A uj(a, ωj) is a
singleton.
The second assumption is the main assumption underlying our theorem. In fact, without
such an assumption the result will not hold, as demonstrated by Example 1 with ε = 0. In
words, given the receiver’s and any sender’s states, there is still some residual uncertainty
about other senders’ states, and in particular on the possibility that their preferences are
aligned with the receiver.
Assumption 2 For every pair of senders i 6= j and every (ωj , ωR) ∈ Ωj × ΩR that has
positive probability under µ0, there exists an ωi ∈ Ωi with P (ωi | (ωj, ωR)) > 0 for which
argmaxa∈A ui(a, ωi) = argmaxa∈A uR(a, ωR).
This assumption warrants some discussion, as it is the main driving force behind our
result. First, note that the assumption is “weak” in that it is implied by the following
“standard” assumptions: that the prior µ0 has full support, and that there are no un-
desirable actions—for each sender i and each action a, there is some state ωi for which
a = argmaxa′∈A ui(a
′, ωi). Second, note that Assumption 2 will be satisfied for any prior
when senders’ preferences are perturbed a bit so that each sender, independently but with
arbitrarily small probability, is aligned with the receiver (as in Example 1).
Next, in order to describe the game we require some preliminary notation. A signal for
player i is composed of an abstract message space, Mi, and a function πi : ΩiR 7→ ∆(Mi),
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where ΩiR = Ωi × ΩR and ∆(·) denotes the corresponding set of probability distributions.
Let Πi denote the set of all signals of sender i.
The persuasion game we study proceeds as follows. First, each sender i chooses a dis-
tribution pii over Πi. The receiver observes the vector (π1, . . . , πn) drawn from (pi1, . . . ,pin),
after which he chooses one of the players, say j. The state is then realized, sender j learns
the state ωjR
def
= (ωj, ωR) and the receiver gets (only) the message πj(ωjR) sent by the chosen
player j. Finally, R takes an action in A and payoffs of all players are realized.5
Without loss of generality we assume that Mi ⊆ A, and interpret the message realized
by the signal as a recommended action to the receiver. A signal πi is incentive compatible
(IC) if, upon any realization a ∈ A of πi, the receiver’s optimal action is a. We invoke the
revelation principle and assume, without loss of generality, that senders are restricted to IC
signals. Hereinafter we let Πi denote the set of all such IC signals.
Denote by vR(π) the expected utility of the receiver when he takes his optimal action
following every realization of the signal π. Denote by vi(π) the expected utility of sender i
when the receiver takes these actions. We write π j π
′ when vj(π) ≥ vj(π
′), and π ≻j π
′
when vj(π) > vj(π
′), for any j ∈ {1, . . . , n, R}.
Note that for any sender j, a signal πj and realization a ∈ A of πj induce a posterior
belief over Ω. Denote this belief by 〈πj | a〉, and by 〈πj〉 the distribution of beliefs induced
by realizations of πj. Furthermore, denote by 〈πj〉i the marginal distribution of 〈πj〉 over Ωi,
and by 〈πj〉(i,R) the marginal distribution of 〈πj〉 over Ωi × ΩR.
Finally, we will be interested in the Nash equilibria of this game. We assume that
when the receiver is indifferent between multiple senders, he chooses one of them uni-
formly at random—this is akin to the standard assumption in Bayesian persuasion that
the receiver breaks ties in favor of the sender.6 To this end, fix the decision rule D :
Π1× . . .×Πn 7→ ∆({1, . . . , n}) of the receiver as a uniformly-random choice of a sender from
the set {j : πj R πi ∀i ∈ {1, . . . , n}}.
Definition 1 A Nash equilibrium (NE) is a profile pi = (pi1, . . . ,pin) with the following
property: There do not exist a sender i and distribution pi′i over signals with
E
[
vi(pi
′
D(pi′))
]
> E
[
vi(piD(pi))
]
,
5We stress that the receiver chooses a sender with whom to interact after he observes the signal pii drawn
from each sender i’s distribution pii. Were he to make this choice after observing only the distributions pii,
the model would be identical to one restricted to pure strategies, since each pii is equivalent to some pii in
terms of the senders’ and receiver’s eventual utilities.
6Our result holds also for weaker assumptions on the tie-breaking rule—see Appendix A.
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where pi′ is the profile pi but with pi′i replacing pii.
3 Fully-Informative Equilibrium
We are interested in fully-informative signals, in which the receiver obtains enough informa-
tion to always take his optimal action. Formally,
Definition 2 A signal πi is fully informative if for every a ∈ supp(πi) and every ωR ∈
supp (〈πi | a〉R) the recommended action a = argmaxb∈A uR(b, ωR).
Moreover, we are interested in fully-informative profiles of signals:
Definition 3 A profile pi is fully informative if, with probability 1, the profile (π1, . . . , πn)
drawn from pi satisfies the following: For every sender j that is chosen by the receiver with
positive probability it holds that πj is fully informative.
Our main result is then:
Theorem 1 Every NE of the game is fully informative.
The main idea underlying the proof of Theorem 1 is best illustrated by the simpler case
in which pi is a pure profile, say (π1, . . . , πn). Suppose that in this profile, player j is always
chosen by the receiver, but that πj is not fully informative. In this case we can construct a
profitable deviation for any other player i. First, in Lemma 1 we show that this other player
can simulate the signal of player j, by playing a signal π′i that yields the same marginal
distribution over his own and the receiver’s states as πj. Because of this equivalence in
marginal distributions, both the receiver and player i are indifferent between πj and π
′
i.
Then, in Lemma 3 we show that player i can modify π′i to yield a signal π
′′
i that both he and
the receiver strictly prefer to π′i and hence to πj . The way he does this is by making π
′
i a
touch more informative (to improve the receiver’s utility), but only when his own preferences
are aligned with the receiver’s (to also improve his own utility). This is feasible for i, because
he knows his own state while j does not. This deviation thus yields a profile in which the
receiver always chooses π′′i , which player i strictly prefers to the current profile in which πj
is chosen.
3.1 Preliminary Lemmas
We begin with some lemmas that will be used in the proof of Theorem 1.
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Lemma 1 For every pair of senders i 6= j and every signal πj ∈ Πj there exists a signal
πi ∈ Πi for which 〈πi〉(i,R) = 〈πj〉(i,R).
In words, sender i can simulate any signal of j so that the posterior distribution over the
payoff relevant states of i and R equals that induced by j’s signal.
Proof: The proof is by construction. Fix a pair of senders i 6= j and a signal πj ∈ Πj .
For each action a ∈ supp(πj), recall that πj induces a distribution 〈πj | a〉(i,R) over states
Ωi × ΩR, namely a probability P (ωiR | πj = a) for each state ωiR. Let the signal πi be the
distribution over A generated as follows: In each state ωiR, signal πi takes each value a ∈ A
with probability P (πj = a | ωiR), where
P (πj = a | ωiR) =
P (ωiR | πj = a) · P (πj = a)
P (ωiR)
.
In this construction,
P (ωiR | πi = a) =
P (πi = a | ωiR) · P (ωiR)∑
ω′
iR
P (πi = a | ω′iR) · P (ω
′
iR)
=
P (πj = a | ωiR) · P (ωiR)∑
ω′
iR
P (πj = a | ω′iR) · P (ω
′
iR)
= P (ωiR | πj = a)
for every ωiR and a. Thus, 〈πi〉(i,R) = 〈πj〉(i,R).
Note that in Lemma 1, the marginal distributions over ωR, given any recommended action
a, is equal for πj and πi. Therefore, if πj is IC, then so is πi.
Lemma 2 For every pair of senders i 6= j, signal πj ∈ Πj, realization a ∈ supp(πj),
and ωR ∈ supp(〈πj | a〉R) there exists ωi ∈ supp(〈πj | a〉i) for which argmaxb∈A ui(b, ωi) =
argmaxb∈A uR(b, ωR).
Proof: Fix some realization a ∈ supp(πj) and state ωjR ∈ supp(〈πj | a〉(j,R)). By Assump-
tion 2, for every pair of senders i 6= j and every ωjR ∈ Ωj ×ΩR, there exists an ωi ∈ Ωi with
P (ωi | ωjR) > 0 for which argmaxa∈A ui(a, ωi) = argmaxa∈A uR(a, ωR). It remains to show
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that this ωi ∈ supp(〈πj | a〉i):
P (ωi | πj = a) =
P (ωi) · P (πj = a | ωi)
P (πj = a)
=
P (ωi) ·
∑
ω′
jR
P (πj = a | ωi, ω
′
jR) · P (ω
′
jR | ωi)
P (πj = a)
=
P (ωi) ·
∑
ω′
jR
P (πj = a | ω
′
jR) ·
P (ωi|ω′jR)·P (ω
′
jR
)
P (ωi)
P (πj = a)
≥
P (ωi) · P (πj = a | ωjR) ·
P (ωi|ωjR)·P (ωjR)
P (ωi)
P (πj = a)
> 0,
where the strict inequality follows from Assumption 2 and the fact that all other terms are
also strictly positive.
Lemma 3 Fix a pair of senders i 6= j and a signal πj ∈ Πj that is not fully informative.
Then there exists a signal πi ∈ Πi for which both πi ≻R πj and πi ≻i πj.
Proof: Since πj is not fully informative, there exist an action a ∈ supp(πj) and a state
ω ∈ supp (〈πj | a〉R) such that a 6= argmaxb∈A uR(b, ω).
By Lemma 1 there exists a signal π′i for which 〈π
′
i〉(i,R) = 〈πj〉(i,R). This implies that both
vi(π
′
i) = vi(πj) and vR(π
′
i) = vR(πj).
Consider the set ΩaR
def
={ωR ∈ supp (〈π
′
i | a〉R)}. For every ωR ∈ Ω
a
R let b
ωR = argmaxb∈A uR(b, ωR)
be the optimal action for the receiver in state ωR. By Lemma 2, for every ωR ∈ Ω
a
R there
exists ωb
ωR
i ∈ supp(〈π
′
i | a〉i) for which b
ωR = argmaxb∈A ui(ω
bωR
i , b).
We now construct the signal πi, as follows:
1. Given any state, generate the recommendation a′ according to π′i.
2. If the realized recommendation is a′ 6= a, signal πi is realized as a
′.
3. If the realized recommendation is a′ = a and the state is
(
ωb
ωR
i , ωR
)
for some ωR ∈ Ω
a
R,
then:
(a) with probability εωR (to be determined below) signal πi is realized as b
ωR , and
(b) with probability 1− εωR the signal is realized as a′.
4. Otherwise (the realized recommendation is a′ = a but the state is not
(
ωb
ωR
i , ωR
)
),
signal πi is realized as a
′.
10
We will set εωR in 3(a) above so that the following is achieved: if the realized recommen-
dation of π′i is a, then with some small probability, πi is fully informative, and is realized as
bωR = argmaxa∈A uR(a, ωR). Furthermore, in the case when πi is fully informative, the state
ωR is revealed (through the recommended action b
ωR) only when the state of player i is ωb
ωR
i .
That is, the signal reveals the optimal action for the receiver precisely in those cases when
that same action is also optimal for sender i.
To achieve this, set Λa = {ωR : a = argmaxb uR(b, ωR)}. We will set ε
ωR so that,
conditional on realizing 3(a) above, each recommendation a is realized with probability
proportional to P (ωR ∈ Λ
a | π′i = a). Thus, this is akin to playing a fully informative signal
with some small probability. Formally, set
εωR =
ε · P (ωR | π
′
i = a)
P
((
ωb
ωR
i , ωR
)
| π′i = a
)
for ε > 0. Set ε small enough so that εωR ≤ 1 for all ωR ∈ Ω
a
R.
Hence, if the realized recommendation of π′i is a
′ = a and the state is some ωR ∈ Ω
a
R,
then the signal πi is realized as a with the following probability. For a 6= a,
P (πi = a | π
′
i = a) =
∑
ωR∈Λa∩Ω
a
R
εωR · P (ωai , ωR | π
′
i = a)
=
∑
ωR∈Λa∩Ω
a
R
ε · P (ωR | π
′
i = a)
= ε · P (ωR ∈ Λ
a | π′i = a) .
Because the signal πi thus constructed is sometimes realized as π
′
i and sometimes is fully
informative, πi ≻R π
′
i. Furthermore, since the fully informative recommendation is realized
precisely when sender i and the receiver’s preferences are aligned, πi ≻i π
′
i. Combining this
with the facts above that vi(π
′
i) = vi(πj) and vR(π
′
i) = vR(πj) yields the claimed result.
Finally, the following lemma essentially extends Lemma 3 to mixed strategies by the
senders. It states that if in some profile a sender plays signals that are almost never chosen,
then he has a profitable deviation.
Lemma 4 Fix a NE pi that is not fully-informative. Then no sender i’s strategy pii has
positive measure on any set of signals that is chosen by the receiver with probability 0.
Before proving the lemma we develop some notation. For a profile pi, let Ti = supp (vR(pii))
be the set of possible receiver payoffs attainable by a signal in sender i’s support, and denote
11
by τi = min Ti.
7 Furthermore, denote by τ = maxi τi. Observe that the receiver will never
choose a signal πi with vR(πi) < τ , since there will always be some signal leading to higher
utility available. Also, note that all signals πi with vR(πi) > τ are potentially chosen in
equilibrium.
Finally, we denote by pi−i the profile pi with sender i removed. We also slightly mis-
use notation and write D(π−i) as a uniformly-random choice of a sender from the set
{j : πj R πk ∀k ∈ {1, . . . , n} \ {i}}.
Proof of Lemma 4. pii is i’s equilibrium strategy, which implies that i is indifferent
between all but a measure 0 of the signals in the support of pii. That is, for each such signal,
sender i considers the expected utility from that signal: the probability that it is chosen
by the receiver times the utility i derives from it. In equilibrium, the expected utility of a
particular signal is equal for all signals.
Now, suppose towards a contradiction that pii has positive measure on a set of signals
that is chosen by the receiver with probability 0. Thus, by the above, i sometimes plays
signals that are almost never chosen by the receiver. This leads to utility arbitrarily close
to E
[
vi(πD(pi−i))
]
for sender i. The equilibrium indifference then implies that this same
expected utility is obtained by sender i for all the signals in the support of pii. Thus, his
equilibrium payoff is arbitrarily close to E
[
vi(πD(pi−i))
]
.
We now construct a profitable deviation for sender i, as follows. Let j 6= i and πj satisfy
vi(πj) ≥ vi(πk) for all senders k 6= i and signals πk ∈ supp(pik) with vR(πk) ≥ τ , and for
which vR(πj) ≥ τ . That is, πj is the best signal for sender i played in equilibrium by any
other sender j that is potentially chosen by the receiver. If πj is not fully-informative, then
by Lemma 3 there exists a signal π′i for sender i that is strictly better than πj for both i
and the receiver. Sender i’s profitable deviation is then to play pi′i, which is the same as pii
except that it replaces the set of signals that is chosen by the receiver with probability 0
with π′i. This deviation is profitable, contradicting the assumption that pi is a NE.
If πj is fully informative, then there are two cases. First, if vi(πj) > E
[
vi(πD(pi−i))
]
,
then sender i has a profitable deviation to always play a fully-informative signal. If vi(πj) =
E
[
vi(πD(pi−i))
]
, then it must be the case that for all k 6= i and signals πk ∈ supp(pik) for
which vR(πk) ≥ τ the equality vi(πk) = E
[
vi(πD(pi−i))
]
holds. If some such πk is not fully-
informative, then sender i can invoke the same profitable deviation as above, by simulating
and improving upon πk as in Lemma 3. If, on the other hand, all such πk’s are fully
7Recall that the support of a random variable is the smallest closed subset of values with measure 1, and
so the minimum of Ti exists.
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informative, then whenever the receiver chooses a signal from any sender other than i, that
signal is fully informative. But this implies that the receiver always has a fully-informative
signal available, and, since such a signal is optimal for him, he will always choose it. This
contradicts the assumption that pi is not fully-informative.
3.2 Proof of Theorem 1
Proof of Theorem 1. Fix a NE pi, and suppose towards a contradiction that pi is not
fully-informative.
Observe that all senders have the same minimal τi, namely τi = τ . To see this, let j be
the sender for whom τj is maximal—namely, τj ≥ τk for all k ∈ {1, . . . , n}—and suppose
there is some sender i for whom τi < τj. But this implies that pii has positive measure
on those signals that lead to receiver payoffs in [τi, τj), signals that are never chosen. By
Lemma 4, this is a contradiction.
Now, note that, since pi is not fully-informative, the signals leading to receiver utility τ
are not fully informative (since fully informative signals lead to utilities that are maximal
for the receiver and are thus always chosen).
Next, we will consider three cases, corresponding to whether all, some, or no sender
strategies put positive measure on the set of signals that lead to receiver utility exactly
equal to τ :
(i) P (vR(pii) = τ) = 0 for all i ∈ {1, . . . , n}.
(ii) P (vR(pii) = τ) > 0 and P (vR(pij) = τ) = 0 for some i, j ∈ {1, . . . , n}.
(iii) P (vR(pii) = τ) > 0 for all i ∈ {1, . . . , n}.
We begin with case (i). Let i be any sender, and note that the equality P (vR(pii) = τ) = 0
implies that for all ε > 0,
P (vR(pii) ∈ [τ, τ + ε]) > 0
(for otherwise, τ would not be in the support of vR(pii)). Thus, sender i chooses a signal
πi with vR(πi) ∈ [τ, τ + ε] with positive probability. Furthermore, the probability that i’s
signal is chosen by the receiver, when he plays such a signal, approaches 0 with ε:
lim
ε→0
P (D(pi) = i | vR(πi) ∈ [τ, τ + ε]) = 0.
This is because, as ε approaches 0, the probability that there is some j 6= i and πj such
that vR(πj) > τ + ε approaches 1, and the receiver will choose the sender offering the signal
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with the highest vR. Thus, sender i’s strategy pii has positive measure on a set of signals
that is almost never chosen by the receiver. By Lemma 4, this is a contradiction.
We now consider case (ii), that P (vR(pii) = τ) > 0 and P (vR(pij) = τ) = 0 for some
i, j ∈ {1, . . . , n}. Here, observe that signals πi ∈ supp(pii | vR(pii) = τ) are played by sender
i with positive probability, but are chosen with probability 0 (since any signal of sender j will
be preferred over πi). As above, this again implies that sender i’s strategy pii has positive
measure on a set of signals that is almost never chosen by the receiver. Again by Lemma 4,
this is a contradiction.
Finally, we consider case (iii), that P (vR(pii) = τ) > 0 for all i ∈ {1, . . . , n}. Note that,
under case (iii), P
(
vR
(
πD(pi)
)
= τ
)
> 0.
We consider three cases. First, if for some sender i it holds that E[vi(pii) | vR(πD(pi)) =
τ ] ≥ E[vi(pij) | vR(πD(pi)) = τ ] for all j 6= i, with a strict inequality for at least one such j,
then sender i has the following profitable deviation: Instead of choosing (pii | vR(pii) = τ),
sender i chooses pi′i: Replace every πi ∈ supp(pii | vR(pii) = τ) with π
′
i such that with
(arbitrarily) small probability ε signal π′i is realized as a fully-informative signal—that is, it
is realized as argmaxa∈A uR(a, ωR) in every state ωR ∈ ΩR—and with probability 1− ε it is
realized as πi. For any ε > 0, the new signal distribution pi
′
i will be more informative than
pij , and so the receiver will choose sender i with probability 1 (conditional on vR(πD(pi)) = τ),
leading to a strict increase in i’s utility. Since ε can be arbitrarily small, this does not harm
sender i much, and so for small enough ε the overall gain from the deviation is positive.
The second case is if for some sender i it holds that E[vi(pii) | vR(πD(pi)) = τ ] < E[vi(pij) |
vR(πD(pi)) = τ ] for some j 6= i. In this case, sender i has the following profitable deviation:
Replace (pii | vR(pii) = τ) by pi
′
i, where pi
′
i is the “simulation” of (pij | vR(pij) = τ). That
is, for each πj ∈ supp(pij | vR(pij) = τ), i plays the simulation π
′
i of πj guaranteed to exist
by Lemma 1. Under this deviation, sender i’s utility, conditional on receiver utility equal to
τ , is equal to E[vi(pij) | vR(πD(pi)) = τ ]. By assumption, this is a strict improvement over
E[vi(pii) | vR(πD(pi)) = τ ].
The third case is if for some sender i it holds that E[vi(pii) | vR(πD(pi)) = τ ] = E[vi(pij) |
vR(πD(pi)) = τ ] for all j 6= i. Note that this expected utility is thus equal to E[vi(πD(pi)) |
vR(πD(pi)) = τ ]. Let ℓ and πℓ satisfy vi(πℓ) ≥ vi(πk) for all senders k 6= i and signals
πk ∈ supp(pik). That is, πℓ is the signal yielding highest utility to sender i played by any
other sender. In this third case sender i has the following profitable deviation: If πℓ is
not fully-informative, replace (pii | vR(pii) = τ) by π
′
i, where π
′
i is the improvement on
the simulation of πℓ guaranteed to exist by Lemma 3. By the lemma and assumption,
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vi(π
′
i) > vi(πℓ) ≥ E[vi(pii) | vR(πD(pi)) = τ ]. Since sender i deviates to a signal that yields
him the highest possible utility over all other senders’ signals, this deviation is profitable.
If πℓ is fully informative and vi(πℓ) > E[vi(pii) | vR(πD(pi)) = τ ], replace (pii | vR(pii) = τ)
by a fully-informative signal. This again is a profitable deviation.
Finally, suppose πℓ is fully informative and vi(πℓ) = E[vi(pii) | vR(πD(pi)) = τ ] =
E[vi(πD(pi)) | vR(πD(pi)) = τ ]. The equality vi(πℓ) = E[vi(πD(pi)) | vR(πD(pi)) = τ ] implies
that for all senders k 6= i and signals πk ∈ supp (pik | vR(pik) = τ) the equality vi(πk) =
E[vi(πD(pi)) | vR(πD(pi)) = τ ] holds. If some such πk is not fully-informative, then sender i
can invoke the same profitable deviation as above, by simulating and improving upon πk as
in Lemma 3. If, on the other hand, all such πk’s are fully informative, then whenever the
receiver chooses a signal πk from any sender other than i, and obtains utility vR(πk) = τ , that
signal is fully informative. However, this is a contradiction, since pi is not fully-informative
and so τ is strictly less than the receiver’s optimal utility.
4 Discussion and Summary
Underlying our results is an observation that competing senders always prefer to be chosen by
the receiver in the interim stage. Consequently, they engage in a kind of a war of attrition and
yield more and more information to the receiver until, finally, they disclose all of the receiver’s
payoff-relevant information. This result holds whenever the senders are not perfectly aligned
in their interests. The sender’s advantage when he monopolizes the information becomes a
knife-edge advantage with more than one sender. Whenever senders’ interests are perfectly
aligned they can still enjoy this advantage. However, any perturbation, no matter how small,
will result in the complete transfer of the surplus to the receiver.
To model the possibility of senders’ misalignment we consider a state space with a product
structure, whereby each player’s utility function only depends on one entry of the state. Note
that, as we allow correlation between senders and receiver, this model does not exclude the
possibility that a sender and receiver care about the same set of states (as is standard in the
single-sender model). What our model allows is the introduction of conditions whereby one
sender is not perfectly informed about the states of other senders, and so misalignment of
interests is always possible.
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Appendix
A Tie-Breaking Rule
In this section we discuss extensions of our main result to different tie-breaking rules of the
receiver.
We first observe that, although we assumed that when the receiver is indifferent between
several senders’ signals he chooses one uniformly at random, this assumption is not necessary
for our proof. In fact, for the proof to go through, we need the following property: For every
profile π = (π1, . . . , πn), sender i, deviation π
′
i, and profile π
′ = (π′i, π−i), if i 6∈ supp(D(π))
and i 6∈ supp(D(π′)), then the distributions D(π) and D(π′) are identical. This property
is satisfied by any tie-breaking rule that depends only on the identities and signals of the
best senders, from the receiver’s perspective. It could even involve different distributions for
different top senders or different signals that they choose.
We note that without such a property, one problem that may arise is that a deviating
sender may be “punished” by the receiver for deviating: For example, suppose i is never
chosen under profile π, nor under π′. However, the receiver may break ties differently under
π′ than under π in such a way as to harm i and so discourage him from deviating. This
possibility is not accounted for in our proof of Theorem 1. We do not know whether our
main result holds without this restriction on tie-breaking rules.
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For the special case in which we restrict to pure NE, however, we do have a stronger
result—one that is even stronger than only allowing for unrestricted tie-breaking rules. To
describe this strengthening, denote by D the set of all optimal decision rules for the receiver:
D = {D : Π1 × . . .×Πn 7→ ∆({1, . . . , n}) : i ∈ supp (D (π1, . . . , πn))⇒ πi R πj ∀j ∈ {1, . . . , n}} .
In words, given a profile of players’ signals, an optimal decision rule D of the receiver is any
distribution over senders whose signals he prefers over others’. We now define the notion of
a (pure) pessimistic Nash equilibrium:
Definition 4 A pure pessimistic Nash equilibrium of the game is a profile (π1, . . . , πn) and
a receiver’s decision rule D ∈ D with the following property: For every sender i and signal
π′i there exists a decision rule D
′ ∈ D for which
E
[
ui(a, ωi) | πD′(π′i,π−i)
]
≤ E
[
ui(a, ωi) | πD(π1,...,πn)
]
,
where (π′i, π−i) is the profile (π1, . . . , πn) but with π
′
i replacing πi.
Note the quantifier on D′: Counterfactually, a deviation is profitable if it is profitable for
every decision rule following the deviation. Hence the qualifier in the definition above—a
deviating sender is pessimistic about the receiver’s reaction to his deviation. Note that the
set of pure pessimistic Nash equilibria is a superset of the set of pure NE, and so the weaker
definition renders our main result stronger.
In particular, the proof of Theorem 1 actually shows that all pure pessimistic NE of
the game are fully informative. To see this, note that the proof, when restricted to pure
equilibria, does the following: In a non-fully-informative profile, whenever a sender is not
chosen with probability 1, he can construct a profitable deviation under which he will be
chosen with probability 1. That is, the deviation is such that his signal is strictly preferred
by the receiver over all other signals, and so the issue of tie-breaking is rendered moot.
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